



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26081
14 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of 13 July 1993 (S/26076), I have the honour to request that the attached resolution, CM/Res.1451, on the situation in Angola, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, at its Fifty-eighth Ordinary Session held in Cairo, Egypt, from 21 to 26 June 1993, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Perezi K. KAMUNANWIRE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Uganda
to the United Nations
Chairman of the African Group

Annex

RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Fifty-eighth Ordinary Session in Cairo, Egypt, from 21 to 26 June 1993,

Recalling the elections of 29 and 30 September 1992, considered to be free and fair by the United Nations, the OAU and other observers,

Recalling further the various resolutions on the situation in Angola, mainly adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers, OAU Ad hoc Committee on Southern Africa, the Summits of the Front Line States, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA),

Recalling also, in particular resolutions 804, 811 and 834 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council,

Having carefully followed the information furnished to the Council by the representative of the Angolan Government on the development of the situation in the country,

Considering the efforts made by the Government of the Côte d'Ivoire towards the restoration of peace,

Deeply concerned with the continued deterioration of the political and military situation and with the catastrophic conditions faced by the population due to the lack of humanitarian support, caused by the resumption of war by UNITA,

Seriously concerned by the failure of the negotiations held in Abidjan between the Angolan Government and UNITA, under United Nations auspices, motivated by UNITA's refusal to sign the Abidjan Protocol, thus making it difficult to implement a cease-fire process,

Reaffirming the imperative need of all countries to respect the territorial integrity and observe the inviolability of the borders of the Angolan State and the principle of non-interference in its internal affairs:

1. Condemns UNITA for rejecting the results of the 29 and 30 September 1992 elections and urges it to comply with the "PEACE ACCORDS";

2. Strongly condemns UNITA for its escalation of military action and for the continuing occupation of towns and villages, which endangers the peace process and declares that this occupation constitutes a serious violation of the "PEACE ACCORDS";

3. Strongly condemns UNITA and holds it accountable for the continuing massacre of the defenceless population and the destruction of important economic infrastructures;

4. Demands that UNITA immediately refrain from these actions and unconditionally withdraw its troops from the occupied areas;
5. Strongly appeals to UNITA to immediately return to the interrupted peace talks with the Angolan Government, to sign a durable cease-fire agreement in order to ensure the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";
6. Notes with satisfaction the decision of the United States of America to recognize the legitimate Government of Angola and to establish diplomatic relations with the Government of Angola;
7. Commends the readiness of the Angolan Government to maintain a dialogue with UNITA in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict;
8. Also congratulates the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and, in particular, His Excellency President Houphouët Boigny on the contributions made to the cause of restoring peace in Angola and encourages the President to pursue the already initiated action by making UNITA assume a constructive and peaceful posture;
9. Reaffirms its full support for the efforts deployed by the United Nations and the international observers in the peace process in Angola and encourages them to continue to work towards the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict;
10. Commends the efforts made by the Angolan Government to ensure the functioning and strengthening of the democratic institutions derived from the multiparty elections of September 1992;
11. Appeals to African States, particularly those supporting UNITA, to put an immediate and effective end to military and other forms of support to the UNITA military wing;
12. Appeals to member States and the international community to provide urgent and adequate humanitarian assistance to the Angolan Government, to alleviate the suffering of the people;
13. Urgently appeals to member States and the international community to provide the Angolan Government with total political, diplomatic and material support in order to strengthen its capacity to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its institutions, as well as to safeguard democracy and restore peace;
14. Reiterates its pressing need to mobilize and sensitize the international community, particularly countries supporting UNITA, to ensure the cessation of hostilities in Angola with the view to attaining a political and peaceful solution to the conflict;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation and to submit a report to the next Council of Ministers on the developments in Angola.



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LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to refer to Security Council resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993). I have met with my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, and have come to the conclusion that developments at the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport deserve the urgent attention of the Council.

In a letter dated 13 July, the National Security Director of the Government of Croatia, Mr. Hrvoje Sarinić, informed the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), General Jean Cot, of his Government's intention to reopen the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport on 18 July 1993. In this context, he requested UNPROFOR to take all necessary measures to "ensure that the event will pass without incident".

The local Serb authorities and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have made it clear to UNPROFOR that they do not consider the planned event to be in conformity with Security Council resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993) and that they perceive the planned events as a provocation.

Following consultations with my Special Representative, I have instructed the Force Commander of UNPROFOR immediately to advise the Croatian authorities of the need for all concerned to act in a manner that would be conducive to the maintenance of peace. The Force Commander has also pointed out to Mr. Sarinić that the Security Council in its resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993) has specifically called for the Croatian armed forces to withdraw from the areas concerned and that the event planned for 18 July is not in keeping with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Moreover, the Force Commander has reminded the Croatian Government that UNPROFOR had been excluded by the Croatian authorities from entering the Maslenica area and, therefore, was hardly in a position to ensure that the reopening takes place without incident.

The Council may wish to consider the danger posed by this situation and decide upon appropriate action.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



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LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 July 1993, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and of all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

The Government of Lebanon is pleased to report that, since the last renewal of UNIFIL, major positive developments have accelerated the establishment of national peace, stability and security. The Lebanese Army and internal security forces deployed throughout the country, with the exception of the Israeli-occupied area, are constantly being upgraded. Law and order are rigorously enforced and travel through the country is safe and unrestricted. These achievements have allowed the Government to focus on its reconstruction and development plans. The World Bank has approved a \$175 million loan to Lebanon and many Governments and international and private financial institutions have committed themselves to the rehabilitation process. Concurrently, the Government of Lebanon is exerting great efforts to resettle thousands of civilians displaced by civil strife, two Israeli invasions and the sustained occupation of the south.

In addition, my Government is pleased to report that the command of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army continue to coordinate in perfect harmony with the goal of deploying the latter throughout the south of the country up to its internationally recognized boundaries.

Despite the participation of Lebanon and Israel in the ongoing bilateral peace negotiations commenced in Madrid 20 months ago, Israel is continuing to perpetuate its occupation of the south irrespective of the significant achievements made by the people and Government of Lebanon to consolidate national unity and central authority. Israel's policies and practices regarding Lebanon have not changed and its military and proxy militia have continued unabated their brutal and arbitrary war against Lebanon's sovereignty, citizens and property.

The daily violence in southern Lebanon is the result of the continued Israeli occupation, which is against the will of the Lebanese people and the root of all problems between the two countries. As long as Israel continues its occupation, hostilities and bloodshed on Lebanese national soil will persist. As sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations, the people of Lebanon will exercise their legal right of individual and collective resistance against occupation until Israel withdraws forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory, as stated in Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

Lebanon is wholly committed to the peace process and to the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region. However, in spite of the ongoing negotiations, Israel refuses to implement resolution 425 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The latest of these is Security Council resolution 799 of 18 December 1992, calling for the immediate repatriation of 415 Palestinian civilians expelled to Lebanon in violation of the Charter and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

The responsibility for the implementation of Security Council resolutions fall on the Council and, in particular, on its five permanent members. In view of the lack of any tangible progress in the peace talks and the threat Israel's continued intransigence poses to this process, it remains incumbent upon the Security Council to demonstrate that its resolutions are respected and implemented. Israel, as a State Member of the United Nations, cannot remain above the law and the Council must take action to guarantee the prompt implementation of its resolution 425 (1978) and the galvanization of its mechanism set out in resolution 426 (1978). This will enable the Lebanese Government to extend its authority over the entire south of the country up to its internationally recognized boundaries.

In this context, UNIFIL represents a valuable international commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty and civilian population in the occupied south. Its much-needed support and humanitarian assistance are playing an important role in the daily life of the civilian population. However, this assistance cannot be a substitute for the fulfilment of UNIFIL's original mandate as stipulated in Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which is to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in re-establishing its legitimate and effective authority in the area, through its Army and internal security forces.

The Lebanese Government takes this opportunity to pay tribute to the UNIFIL command, troops and administrators, and to the troop-contributing countries for their efforts and sacrifices in serving the cause of peace. It also expresses its deep appreciation for the tireless endeavours of the Secretary-General and his assistants, which are instrumental in the constructive presence and mission of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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15 July 1993

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3255th meeting, on 15 July 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation prevailing in and adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia":

"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the information contained in the letter of the Secretary-General of 14 July 1993 (S/26082) on the situation in and around the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia. It recalls its resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993) and in particular the demand in the former that all parties and others concerned comply strictly with the cease-fire arrangements already agreed and the call on them in the latter to reach an agreement on confidence-building measures.

"The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the latest report on hostilities in the UNPAs, including in particular by the Krajina Serbs, and demands that these hostilities cease immediately.

"The Security Council continues to attach the highest importance to securing the reopening of the Maslenica crossing to civilian traffic. In this context it reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. It recognizes the real and legitimate concern of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in such reopening, as set out in the letter of 12 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia (S/26074). It also recalls the demand in its resolution 802 (1993) that the Croatian armed forces withdraw from the areas in question.

"The Security Council considers that the planned unilateral reopening of the Maslenica bridge and of Zemunik airport on 18 July 1993, in the absence of agreement between the parties and others concerned in cooperation with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), would jeopardize the objectives of the Council's resolutions and in particular the call in its resolution 847 (1993) for agreement on confidence-building measures and the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR to achieve a negotiated settlement to the problem. It urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to refrain from this action.

"The Security Council expresses its support for the efforts of the Co-Chairmen and UNPROFOR and calls on the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with them in this regard and to conclude rapidly the agreement on confidence-building measures called for in its resolution 847 (1993). It joins the Secretary-General in his call to the parties and others concerned to act in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and to refrain from any action which would undermine these efforts, and calls upon the parties to assure UNPROFOR's freedom of access in particular to the area surrounding the Maslenica crossing."



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S/26085
15 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Council have considered those parts of your report of 12 July (S/26063) which are within the competence of the Council. They expressed their deep appreciation for your efforts and those of your Special Envoy to achieve a peaceful settlement to the crisis in Haiti, and declared their readiness to give the fullest possible support to the Agreement signed on Governors Island, New York, on 3 July 1993.

The members of the Council earnestly hope that the inter-Haitian dialogue which is beginning in New York this week will facilitate rapid progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the Governors Island Agreement. They look forward to the full implementation of all stages of that Agreement, and confirm their readiness to suspend the measures imposed by resolution 841 (1993) immediately after the ratification of the Prime Minister and his assumption of his functions in Haiti. They agree that provision will also need to be made for the automatic termination of such suspension if at any time you, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, report to the Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any authorities in Haiti have failed to comply in good faith with the Agreement. They declare their readiness to terminate the measures imposed by resolution 841 (1993), on receipt of a report from you, immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

The members of the Council stand ready to take the necessary action urgently upon receipt of your recommendations for the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in the modernization of the Armed Forces and the establishment of a new police force, in accordance with point 5 of the Governors Island Agreement.

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
President of the Security Council



General Assembly
Security Council

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S/26086
15 July 1993
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 46 of the preliminary list*
QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(MALVINAS)

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 13 July 1993 from the Permanent Representatives of
Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to convey to Your Excellency the text of the Joint Statement by the British and Argentine Governments issued in London and Buenos Aires on 12 July 1993 (see annex).

We request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 46 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Argentina

* A/48/50.

Annex

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS

Taking into account the results of the Seventh Meeting of the British-Argentine Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs, held in London from 4 to 5 May 1993, the British and Argentine Governments have issued the present Joint Statement.

Both Governments have agreed that the formula on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, recorded in paragraph 2 of the Joint Statement of 19 October 1989, applies to this Joint Statement and its consequences.

Both Governments have agreed to send jointly the present Statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for distribution as an official document of the General Assembly, under the Agenda Item "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)" and of the Security Council. The United Kingdom will transmit this Joint Statement to the Presidency and Commission of the European Community, and the Government of Argentina will do likewise to the Organisation of American States.

Both Governments agreed:

1. To maintain in force the agreements in Points II, III and IV of the Joint Statement issued in London and Buenos Aires on 25 September 1991;
2. To replace Point I of the Joint Statement issued in London

and Buenos Aires on 25 September 1991 by the following:

I. INTERIM RECIPROCAL INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION SYSTEM

Taking into account the increase of mutual confidence between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic, and in order to progress towards the achievement of a more normal situation in the South West Atlantic, the System will consist of the following provisions:

1. Direct Communications Link

a. The direct communications link between the respective military authorities will be maintained - under the supervision of both Foreign Ministries - in order to ensure the exchange of information to allow adequate reciprocal knowledge of military activities in the South West Atlantic.

b. The respective military authorities are:

British Authority: Commander British Forces
Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Argentine Naval Authority: Comandante del Area Naval
Austral (Ushuaia).

Argentine Air Authority: Jefe de la Novena Brigada
Aerea (Comodoro Rivadavia).

c. The direct communications link between the respective authorities which includes radio, telex transmissions and telephone facsimile will continue to be manned on a 24 hour basis and will be tested weekly.

- d. The communications plan between units and stations of the parties will be maintained, with the addition of an alternative telephone link.

The military authorities may coordinate directly any necessary technical arrangements.

2. Confidence-strengthening Measures

- a. The parties will reciprocally provide, not less than fourteen days in advance, written information, duly acknowledged, about movements of four or more naval or air units within 55 nautical miles of coasts.
- b. Reciprocal notification of identity, intended track and purpose will be given, not less than 48 hours in advance, of naval combatant units that intend to approach closer to coasts than fifteen nautical miles. These movements will require mutual agreement.

3. Verification

If questions arise concerning the application of the above confidence-strengthening measures, consultations will take place through the direct communications link. If disagreement should occur, the parties will have recourse to the diplomatic channel.

4. Reciprocal Visits

Reciprocal visits to military bases and naval units may be agreed through the diplomatic channel.

5. Application of International Practice

Naval and air units of the parties will observe the normal

procedures to ensure safety when operating in proximity, in particular the provisions of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and the provisions of Annex VI of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.

In situations not specifically covered by this System, normal international practice will be applied on a reciprocal basis.

6. Duration

This system will be reviewed at a meeting of the British-Argentine Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs which will take place within one year of the entry into force of this System, on a date to be agreed through the diplomatic channel.

LONDON and BUENOS AIRES
12 July 1993



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16 July 1993

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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violation by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 15 May 1993, at 0830 hours, three Iraqi military personnel began to dig a trench at the geographic coordinates of 6509-4850 on the map of the Meimeh River, south of border pillar 24/4.
2. On 15 May 1993, at 1200 hours, two explosions, effected by Iraqis, were heard at the geographic coordinates of 692-691 and 703-633 on the map of Baneh, south-east of Sourkooh, at the axis of Shakh Ashkoot, south-west of Jamparaw.
3. On 15 May 1993, at 1500 hours, 30 Iraqis repaired a road and parked 8 trailers at the geographic coordinates of 96700-63400 on the map of Mehran, north-west of border pillar 30.
4. On 16 May 1993, between 0840 and 1000 hours, Iraqi forces patrolled at the geographic coordinates of 405-129 and 39-122 on the map of Khosravi, opposite Darbandjoogh in Iran in no man's land west of border pillar 56/1.
5. On 16 May 1993, at 0940 hours, a number of Iraqi soldiers were seen digging a canal at the geographic coordinates of 39000-59800 on the map of Yebis, in no man's land west of border pillar 22/11 and north-east of border pillar 22/10.
6. On 18 May 1993, at 0900 hours, two Iraqi commanders were seen at the geographic coordinates of 832-193 on the map of Halaleh as they were inspecting the no man's land north-west of border pillar 53/8 in Meimak Heights.
7. On 19 May 1993, at 1843 hours, the Iraqis fired flare bullets at the geographic coordinates of 64-29 on the map of Chazzabeh in no man's land west of border pillar 18/4.
8. On 19 May 1993, the Iraqis constructed four new positions at the geographic coordinates of 42500-55500 on the map of Yebis in no man's land south of border pillar 22/6.

9. On 23 May 1993, at 0930 hours, two Nissan vehicles carrying artillery, five Toyota vehicles carrying personnel and another passenger vehicle were seen at the geographic coordinates of 853-055 on the map of Chai Gharre Tappeh in no man's land south of border pillar 24/7. Those vehicles stopped for 25 minutes and then moved in the direction of the town of Aligharbi.

10. On 23 May 1993, at 1130 hours, six Iraqi personnel were seen passing at the geographic coordinates of 537-246 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land in the area near the Iraqi township of Parvizkhan.

11. On 24 May 1993, at 1100 hours, an Iraqi vehicle dropped off 10 Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of 853-055 on the map of Chai Gharre Tappeh in no man's land south of border pillar 24/17.

12. On 29 May 1993, at 2030 hours, 12 Iraqi forces were stationed at the geographic coordinates of 65200-25600 on the map of Chazzabeh in no man's land south of border pillar 18/2.

13. On 31 May 1993, at 1230 hours, an Iraqi IFA carrying 10 passengers was seen at the geographic coordinates of 511-270 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land east of Hedayat sentry post and north of the village of Majidsalar in Iraq.

14. On 31 May 1993, at 1320 hours, four Iraqis were seen at the geographic coordinates of 622-246 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land around Majid Ghadiragha village.

15. On 9 June 1993, at 2400 hours, anti-revolutionary elements coming from the Iraqi territory and using heavy and light armaments attacked the Cham Naft sentry post at the geographic coordinates of 50-67. The elements who intended to capture the sentry post fled back to Iraq when faced the reaction of Iranian forces.

16. A number of armed Iraqi shepherds pass on a daily basis through no man's land in the Sumar area under the guise of grazing their cattle. These shepherds at times fire shots in the direction of the Iranian forces. Iraqi forces have taken no action to prevent the shepherds from entering the area and shooting at the Iranian forces.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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15 July 1993

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LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By Security Council resolution 845 (1993), regarding the settlement of the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Council urged the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them.

I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the former Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, has accepted my request to continue his good offices to help the parties reach agreement. Mr. Vance will begin his assignment on 1 August 1993.

It is my hope that, as stated in resolution 845 (1993), it will be possible to resolve the difference before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



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15 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Council thank you for your letter of 13 July 1993 (S/26088) concerning Security Council resolution 845 (1993), and welcome the acceptance by Mr. Cyrus Vance of your invitation to continue his good offices with the objective of helping the parties to resolve the difference between them before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
President of the Security Council



Security Council

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16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7
OF RESOLUTION 840 (1993)

1. By paragraph 7 of its resolution 840 (1993) of 15 June 1993, the Security Council requested me to report by the middle of July, including my recommendations on the possible role the United Nations and its agencies might play after the end of the mandate of UNTAC according to the Paris Agreements.

2. The mandate of UNTAC, in accordance with the provision of resolution 745 (1992), extends for a period not to exceed 18 months until the end of the transitional period, that is, until the Constituent Assembly has drafted and approved a Constitution, transformed itself into a legislative assembly and created a new Cambodian Government. According to paragraph 1 of annex 3 to the Paris Agreement, the Constituent Assembly is to perform these tasks within three months from the date of the election, which took place from 23 to 28 May 1993.

I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ELECTION

3. As described in my last report (S/25913), the election in Cambodia was conducted successfully, with 90 per cent of registered voters taking part in the election in a calm and peaceful atmosphere with minimum disruption. The United Nations, having declared each separate stage of the election process - the campaign, the polling and the counting of ballots - free and fair, endorsed the election results. After some initial dissent (see para. 5 below) the Cambodian political parties which had participated in the process also acknowledged acceptance of the results.

4. The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on 14 June 1993. On 30 June, the Constituent Assembly elected its President and two Vice-Presidents, and adopted its Rules of Procedure. Two permanent committees were established: the Committee for Drafting the Constitution and the Committee on Rules of Procedure. The elaboration of a draft constitution is now proceeding. At the request of the Cambodian parties, UNTAC has provided logistical and operational assistance, as well as technical advice, to the Assembly.

5. Notwithstanding the successful holding of the election and the creation of a Constituent Assembly, the post-election period has not been without difficulties. The Party of the State of Cambodia (SOC) made numerous allegations of electoral irregularities and initially withheld recognition of the election results, citing those alleged irregularities, although every

concrete allegation was promptly investigated by UNTAC. After the election, some SOC elements declared a short-lived "secession" in three eastern provinces which, however, collapsed after a few days. SOC has now accepted the results of the election. None the less, allegations will continue to be reviewed under the Electoral Advisory Committee established by my Special Representative.

6. The establishment of an Interim Joint Administration (Provisional National Government), with the guidance of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has proved to be a stabilizing mechanism in the Cambodian polity. This Administration, with Prince Sihanouk as the Head of State, provides for a cooperative framework between all parties which hold seats in the Constituent Assembly. On 1 July 1993, the Assembly met and gave a vote of confidence to the Interim Joint Administration and unanimously adopted the Programme of Action of the Provisional Government for the Coming Three Months. The composition of the Council of Ministers has been agreed, with His Royal Highness Prince Ranariddh of the Front uni national pour un cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC) and Mr. Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) as Co-Chairmen.

7. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) has also declared that it will accept the outcome of the election. Although PDK is not a party to the Interim Joint Administration, tentative discussions have taken place between it and the parties participating in the Administration aimed at achieving national reconciliation. At the same time, low-level cease-fire violations and military activities, mainly involving the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, have continued to occur.

8. The Interim Joint Administration, which will operate during the transitional period, though not foreseen under the Paris Agreements, should be viewed as an attempt to fuse three of the existing administrative structures, and as a manifestation of the common desire for peace, stability and national reconciliation. At the same time, UNTAC, as provided for in the Paris Agreements, continues to cooperate with the Supreme National Council as the unique legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia throughout the transitional period.

II. UNTAC WITHDRAWAL PLAN

9. Detailed plans have been drawn up for the orderly withdrawal of the Military, Civilian Police and other components of UNTAC, taking due account of the tasks that remain for each of them during the remainder of the transitional period. Due to security considerations, the timing of the withdrawal of the civilian staff from the district and provincial levels is closely coordinated with the military withdrawal plan. All proposals are premised on the assumption that the work of the Constituent Assembly in drafting and adopting the constitution, and the subsequent establishment of a new Cambodian Government, will be expeditiously completed.

10. Civilian withdrawal is easier than military withdrawal for several reasons. In some cases, the civilian tasks have already been completed; the whole of the Repatriation Component and the great majority of the staff of the Electoral Component, for example, have already been withdrawn. Secondly, civilian staff

in the countryside are much fewer in number than the military, and can therefore be withdrawn on an individual basis in a flexible manner.

A. Military Component

11. The detailed plan, including timetables, drawn up for the withdrawal of the Military Component is designed to be implemented with maximum flexibility. Since the extraction will be taking place at the height of the rainy season over severely degraded infrastructure, amid a still uncertain military and security situation, it may be necessary to compress, expand, or otherwise modify the withdrawal plan in response to changing conditions on the ground.

12. The plan is divided into three phases. Phase I - planning and preparation - ends on 31 July 1993. During this period, military personnel of the first group of battalions to be withdrawn will commence physical preparations within their sectors. The two succeeding phases are each, in turn, divided into stages. In phase II (1-31 August; stages 1 to 5), as each infantry battalion successively withdraws, along with the related field hospitals, engineering and other units, the infantry battalion in the neighbouring sector will redeploy to cover the vacated sector. In phase III (1 September-15 November; stages 6 to 10), the remaining UNTAC elements are successively to withdraw completely from the country. The withdrawal will be staged via Thailand, Sihanoukville or Phnom Penh. In addition, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has been approached concerning permission to use its territory for the purposes of withdrawal.

13. The first three stages of phase II will take place concurrently starting on 1 August 1993. During that period, the Uruguayan battalion and an Indian forward field hospital will withdraw from the north-eastern provinces of Stung Treng, Ratanak Kiri, Mondul Kiri and Kratie; the Bulgarian battalion will withdraw from the south-central provinces of Kompong Speu and Kandal; and the Tunisian battalion will withdraw from the south-western provinces of Pursat and Kompong Chhnang. As they do so, the Indian, French and Malaysian battalions, respectively, will redeploy to cover the vacated provinces.

14. By the end of August, the Bangladesh battalion will have withdrawn from Siem Reap Province in the north; the Pakistani battalion will withdraw shortly after the end of August from Preah Vihear Province. Personnel from the Dutch and Indonesian battalions will be extending their coverage into those two provinces. At the same time, the forward field hospital in Siem Reap, the Polish engineering detachment and the Chinese engineering battalion will also be withdrawn.

15. Phase III, comprising stages 6 to 10, will involve the successive withdrawal of the Indian battalion, the Malaysian battalion, the forward field hospital at Battambang, the Japanese engineering battalion and the Namibian mine-resistant vehicle detachment. This will then be followed by the withdrawal of the Dutch battalion, the Thai engineering battalion (by road) and a number of logistics elements, while the French and Indonesian battalions will regroup into smaller sectors. The final two stages involve the withdrawal of the two Indonesian battalions, the Ghanaian battalions, the French engineering company, the French battalion and the remaining logistics and medical elements.

16. The withdrawal of the headquarters staff, the Communications Unit, United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and the United Nations Naval Observers (UNNOs) will take place as their tasks are completed. As infantry and other battalions are withdrawn and others are extended to cover the evacuated sectors, UNMO and UNNO teams in the affected provinces will progressively regroup into provincial towns and check-points and be reduced in number. The final withdrawal of all UNTAC personnel is planned to be completed by 15 November 1993.

B. Civilian Police Component

17. The plan for the withdrawal of the 3,500 officers of the Civilian Police Component, which has already commenced, will be effected in three phases. Between 1 July and 1 August 1993, 1,100 officers will be repatriated; between 2 and 28 August, 1,100 more will be repatriated; and the remaining 1,300 will be withdrawn between 29 August and 30 September.

18. The considerations which affect the timing and modalities of the withdrawal of the Civilian Police Component differ somewhat from those affecting the extraction of the military. Civilian Police units, because of the nature of their work, and unlike military units, are made up of officers of different nationalities throughout the provinces. At the time of their extraction, however, for logistical and financial reasons, they will be withdrawn as national contingents.

19. Furthermore, the Civilian Police withdrawal plan is subject to security considerations. Since the officers are unarmed, they, as other civilian staff, rely on the Military Component for protection against armed attack or threat. Accordingly, as the Military Component withdraws from the district level in areas considered unsafe, the Civilian Police will do likewise. The Component will remain at its current strength in the provincial capitals until the end of the mandate and will continue, where conditions permit, to operate patrols outside the provincial capitals.

C. Other Civilian Components

1. Human Rights

20. The Human Rights Component will continue to fulfil its mandate until the termination of the UNTAC mandate at the end of August 1993. It will pursue allegations of human rights violations and political intimidation, as well as increasing its human rights training activities. Extensive training for the police and the judiciary is planned in July and August. In addition, the Component, in conjunction with the Information Division, will prepare further programmes on human rights for radio and television.

21. One of the major tasks of the Human Rights Component in Phnom Penh will be to prepare for the operational presence of the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia, as mandated by the Commission on Human Rights at its session in February 1993. The Centre is scheduled to become operational on

1 September 1993. A delegation from the Centre visited Cambodia in early June to prepare for the hand-over process and to discuss its operational needs.

22. Currently the Component has some 15 Professional staff in Phnom Penh and 18 Professional staff, with training assistants, in the provinces. Six Professional staff have left the Component to date; a further eight staff members are to leave by the end of July; and the remainder are scheduled to remain until the end of August.

2. Electoral

23. Most of the 963 International Polling Station Officers (IPSOs) were repatriated immediately after the polling and counting of ballots, between 31 May and 5 June 1993. Two hundred and seventeen Polling Officers and 41 fingerprint and handwriting experts were retained for the tendered-ballot count and left between 7 and 15 June. The bulk of the remaining international electoral staff - some 420 District Electoral Supervisors recruited by the United Nations Volunteer Service - departed the mission by 15 June. This left a skeleton staff of 16 officers in Phnom Penh, including the Chief Electoral Officer and three members of the Operations and Computer staff. They will be available to advise on the complaints of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which are being dealt with by the Special Representative's Electoral Advisory Committee, referred to above, and to assist with the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and, if requested, with its work on the Constitution. They will leave when the UNTAC mandate expires. Eight other officers currently in their posts will leave at the end of July.

3. Civil Administration

24. Before the elections, the main aim of the control Civil Administration Component exercised over the five fields specified in the Paris Agreements was to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections. However, the expertise thus gained is considered vital to promoting stability during the remainder of the transitional period. The Component is therefore streamlining its activities to help ensure a smooth transition from the existing administrative structures to the new Government and adapting its control functions accordingly.

25. Thus, at the provincial level, Civil Administration staff will, inter alia, maintain their contacts with the personnel of the existing administrative structures; promote dialogue and national reconciliation; monitor any sale, transfer or disposal of public assets; follow up on any allegations of human rights violations or political intimidation; maintain close contact with and facilitate the work of United Nations agencies and programmes; and assist in the closure of UNTAC offices at the provincial level, including the retrieval and/or disposal of UNTAC property.

26. On the national level, Civil Administration staff are focusing their efforts on, inter alia, the judiciary and the administration of justice; monitoring the implementation of the SNC moratoria on timber, gems and minerals;

border and customs control; and the control and safeguarding of public funds and State assets.

27. Financial control activities will continue through the transitional period at both the provincial and the national levels. Such activities will be strengthened as regards military expenditure and, as mentioned above, the sale or disposal of public assets.

28. Of the 172 international staff of the Component that remain, 115 are located in the provincial capitals, including the municipality of Phnom Penh, and at the border checkpoints. The remaining 57 are based at UNTAC headquarters. Some 32 staff will be leaving on or before the end of July, but most of the rest will continue to work throughout the month of August until the end of the mission.

4. Rehabilitation

29. For the remainder of the transitional period, the Rehabilitation Component will be concentrating on the implementation of small-scale rehabilitation projects yielding quick results. Over the past three months, more than 150 such projects at an estimated cost of \$1.7 million addressing immediate and highly prioritized needs have been compiled. These projects involve the repair and maintenance of public utilities and education and health facilities to improve the quality of life in the countryside. Most projects are highly labour-intensive, thus creating jobs at a time of scarce employment opportunities, and will especially benefit rural communities in northern and eastern Cambodia which have so far been only marginally touched by any form of development assistance.

30. Donor response to the Rehabilitation Component's initiative to implement small-scale quick-impact projects was relatively positive after the election had taken place, while in the period leading up to the election, donors generally expressed great reluctance to support implementation of rehabilitation activities. As a direct response to the Rehabilitation Component's own initiative with the donor community in Phnom Penh and Bangkok, a total of about \$600,000 was pledged. It is increasingly evident, however, that this important activity will not be completed by the end of August, and that arrangements will need to be made to ensure its successful completion.

31. With regard to the withdrawal plan for the Rehabilitation and Economic Affairs Component, 4 staff members are scheduled to leave by 31 July, 5 by 15 August, 3 by 22 August and the remaining 17, at this stage, by the end of UNTAC's mandate.

5. Information/Education Division

32. One third of the Information/Education Division's 45 staff had been released by 30 June 1993, and a further four were due to leave by the end of July. Many of the remaining 25 or so staff members are engaged in radio and television production. They will continue to produce programmes on human rights education and reconstruction and development until the end of the mission. Some

will also remain on hand to document UNTAC's final winding-up and departure. The Division's control function will be devoted mainly to promoting the free flow of information and opinion.

6. Other UNTAC civilian staff and equipment

33. All other civilian personnel, except those required for the liquidation process, will leave the mission upon the expiry of the mandate or shortly thereafter. The liquidation team will complete its work as expeditiously as possible and will deal with all aspects relating to UNTAC assets in the mission area. A separate report on the disposal of UNTAC equipment has been submitted for consideration by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

III. PREPARATIONS FOR THE POST-UNTAC PERIOD

34. Cambodia still faces enormous problems of security, stability, mine clearance, infrastructure improvement and general economic and social development. Despite the positive developments of the last few weeks, the political-military situation remains fragile and the task before the new Government can be expected to be difficult and challenging. Cambodia will clearly require continued international assistance and support.

35. I believe it is important that any future assistance provided by the United Nations be clearly separate from the UNTAC presence. UNTAC was established as an operation with a clearly defined mandate and duration and specific resources. It has performed its function creditably and has now begun the process of withdrawing. UNTAC will soon cease to exist.

36. Various programmes and agencies of the United Nations system, as well as international financial institutions, will be prepared, in consultation with the Cambodian Government, to continue to play their traditional role in rehabilitation, reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance. In this context, the international community should accelerate delivery of assistance already pledged and consider urgently what further assistance might be provided to the Interim Administration and later to the new Government. It is also vitally important to ensure a smooth transition from UNTAC's rehabilitation efforts to post-UNTAC United Nations activities in this area. The UNTAC Rehabilitation Component is already actively engaged in consultations to achieve this objective.

37. In addition, a continued human rights presence has been mandated both under the Paris Agreements and by a decision of the Commission on Human Rights (see para. 21 above). The United Nations could also undertake, with the concurrence of the new Cambodian Government, mine clearance, which will continue to be a major need for years to come.

38. The question of maintaining a small post-UNTAC United Nations military presence has been raised from time to time. The Cambodian Government will, of course, be in a position to make bilateral arrangements, if it so chooses, in respect of assistance in forming unified national armed forces. However, should

the Government request the stationing of a small number of United Nations Military Observers in Cambodia for a limited period as a confidence-building measure and to monitor and report on the security of its borders, the Security Council will no doubt consider such a request at the appropriate time. Such an observer presence could also be utilized to supervise any demobilization of armed forces should such agreement be reached among the Cambodian parties.

39. Whatever the types of assistance requested from the United Nations, I am convinced that it should be provided in a well coordinated and integrated manner. An interim office, along the lines of those I have established elsewhere, would be particularly appropriate in Cambodia as an instrument of post-conflict peace-building. The head of such an office would maintain dialogue with the new Government and facilitate coordination of various assistance programmes to ensure maximum effectiveness while respecting the normal responsibilities of various offices, programmes and agencies in their respective fields. The establishment of such an office, following the unprecedented UNTAC endeavour which is now coming to a conclusion, would serve as a symbol of United Nations continuing commitment to a peaceful future in Cambodia.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

40. In conclusion, I wish to assure the Security Council that UNTAC will continue to discharge its tasks fully and faithfully until the end of its mandate and to do everything possible to assist the Cambodian parties to consolidate the positive results of the election and complete the process of adopting a Constitution and establishing a new Government in accordance with the Paris Agreements. I am convinced that, upon the conclusion of UNTAC's mandate, the international community will respond generously to Cambodia's needs as it continues the difficult process of rebuilding the nation after years of strife and devastation. The United Nations system stands ready to play its role in this effort.



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26091
16 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit a statement forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Consulate of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in Dushanbe in connection with the attack mounted on 13 July 1993 by a group of armed persons and Afghan mujahidin on the village of Sarigor in the Shurabad district of Hatlon region in Tajikistan.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lakim KAYUMOV
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Tajikistan on 13 July 1993 to the Consulate of
Afghanistan in Dushanbe

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan feels obliged to inform the Consulate of the Islamic State of Afghanistan that, today, 13 July 1993, at 4 a.m. a 200-strong group of armed persons and Afghan mujahidin mounted an attack on the village of Sarigor in Shugabad district. The attackers used mortars, rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. The group was commanded by the Afghan field commander Kori Hamidullo. In April and May 1993 a group under his command more than once violated the State frontier in the same district and carried out provocative armed actions deep inside Tajik territory. The commanding officer of the 55th Infantry Division of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Kozi Kabir, was in overall command of the operation and responsible for the supply of reserves and armaments. The group looted and burned down the village of Sarigor and penetrated the territory of the 12th subunit of Russian frontier troops.

Russian frontier troops, subunits of the 201st Motor-rifle Division and forces of the National Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan are conducting combat operations to liberate the area in question and to drive the armed bands from Tajik territory. The attackers have sustained heavy casualties. The number of wounded and dead among the civilian population and the Russian frontier troops is currently being ascertained.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes with particular anxiety and concern that the participation of the commanding officer, subunits of the 55th Infantry Division and citizens of the Islamic State of Afghanistan could lead to a most undesirable state of affairs, create tension and complicate relations between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan voices the categorical protest of the Government of Tajikistan and views this action as a hostile and dangerous provocation and an attempt to violate the territorial integrity of Tajikistan.

The Government of Tajikistan, affirming its commitment to the maintenance and strengthening of good-neighbourly and friendly relations with Afghanistan, nevertheless feels obliged to state that any aggressive action against Tajikistan will be repelled with all available means. The Government of Tajikistan counts on an immediate response by the official authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Stamp of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of Tajikistan



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26092
16 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit a statement by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lakim K. KAYUMOV
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan on
15 July 1993

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan note that following the seventeenth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan, the process of stabilization of the social and political situation is becoming increasingly irreversible, the most serious consequences of the civil war and the recent natural disasters are being eliminated, and ways of extricating the Republic from the severe economic crisis are becoming apparent. Law and order are being established in the country, the return of the refugees continues, and conditions in which the citizens can work in peace are being created.

However, the return of peace to the long-suffering land of Tajikistan is not welcomed by the armed terrorist anti-government groups which have entrenched themselves in the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Recently, these groups have more than once violated the State frontier and created a real threat to the lives of the Russian frontier guards and the residents of regions adjacent to the frontier. Despite heavy losses, provocative armed attacks continue. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that units led by Afghan field commanders from a subunit of the 55th Infantry Division of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan are participating alongside them in these armed provocations. Specifically, on 13 July 1993 a large body of troops from the military formations of the anti-popular forces, supported by Afghan mujahidin and subunits under the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, attacked the frontier village of Sarigor in the Shurabad district. The attack resulted in losses of life and injury, including among the civilian population (the village of Sarigor was looted and burned down).

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan pay tribute to the bravery of the Russian frontier guards and express their deep grief at the heroic deaths of the frontier guards and the troops of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic categorically condemn the attack carried out from the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan against the territory of Tajikistan, and state that such actions deal an irreparable blow to good neighbourly relations between the two countries and are likely to have unpredictable consequences which may lead to their escalation into a conflict on a regional scale. The responsibility for such acts of open aggression perpetrated from Afghan territory rests fully and entirely with the extremist groups in Afghanistan which, in alliance with armed units of the Tajik opposition, are seeking to impede the development of the country, the process of spiritual renewal of society and the building of Tajikistan as a democratic, secular State ruled by law.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic regard this latest barbaric attack as an act of aggression against sovereign Tajikistan as a direct violation of the country's territorial

integrity and security in contravention of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, emphasize the inadmissibility of such acts and reserve the right, if they continue, to take all necessary measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to exercise their rights under the Treaty on Collective Security signed by member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan express their gratitude to the President of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, and to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation for their support to the Tajik people in this difficult time.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan express the hope and conviction that the parliaments and Governments of the parties to the Treaty on Collective Security will discharge to the full their obligations under the Minsk Agreements of 22 January 1993 relating to the conduct of peace-keeping operations in Tajikistan and the defence of the Tajik-Afghan frontier.

(Signed) Emonali S. Rahmonov
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of
the Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) Abdumalik A. Abdullajanov
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Republic of Tajikistan



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26093
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF FIJI TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Fiji to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's telex addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade of the Republic of Fiji containing the text of Security Council resolution 841 (1993).

The Permanent Representative of Fiji has the further honour to inform that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade of the Republic of Fiji has advised that the embargo detailed in paragraphs 5 to 9 of the resolution has been put in place.



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26094
16 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 841 (1993) on the situation in Haiti, I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the measures taken by Belgium to discharge its obligations under paragraphs 5 to 9 of that resolution:

1. The embargo on Haiti became part of the Belgian internal legal system through the adoption of EEC regulation No. 1608/93 of the Council of the European Communities on 24 June 1993. This regulation instituted an embargo on some of the trade between the European Economic Community and Haiti. It is of direct application and covers all the trade referred to in resolution 841 (1993).

2. As regards weapons, ammunition and related matériel, which in any event are still under licence, the provisions of resolution 841 (1993) have been notified to the administrations concerned.

3. The financial embargo measures decided on by the Security Council in resolution 841 (1993) are organized on the basis of article 1, paragraph 1, of the decree-law of 6 October 1944 concerning exchange control.

All the administrations concerned have been given the necessary information and have received the list of bodies and individuals whose assets are to be frozen.

In my capacity as representative of the President of the Council of the European Community, I am including the full text, in English and French, of the above-mentioned EEC regulation No. 1608/93 of the Council of European Communities of 24 June 1993,* adopted pursuant to Security Council resolution

* The text of the legislation is available for consultation in the Office of the Security Council secretariat, Room S-3545.

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841 (1993). This regulation, which is applicable in the twelve States members of the European Community, entered into force on 26 June 1993, the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the European Communities.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26095
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The success of the recent elections in Cambodia, on which I reported to the Security Council in document S/25913 of 10 June 1993, marks the beginning of a particularly delicate phase in the country's transition from conflict to peace and democracy.

During the coming months it will be essential that the Interim Joint Administration structures be able to function properly, and that neither social unrest nor macro-economic disorder be allowed to take hold. It is also important that all those serving in the public domain - be they civil servants, police or members of the armed forces - begin the process of redirecting their allegiances from the factions of the past to the future constitutional Government.

This will contribute to a more stable environment for the Constituent Assembly to complete its work and a smooth and orderly transfer to the new Government of Cambodia as envisaged in the Paris Agreements. It is in the interests of Cambodia and of all those that have supported the peace process that these objectives be attained. Yet there is mounting evidence that without sufficient external support these goals may be in jeopardy.

After careful consideration, I have therefore concluded, on the recommendation of my Special Representative for Cambodia and in consultation with a number of concerned Governments, that urgent measures must be taken to enable UNTAC to provide, for the remainder of the transitional period, and in consultation with the Cambodian authorities, emergency financial assistance in support of the process of restructuring and adjustment of the administrative, police and military structures of the Interim Joint Administration. My Special Representative has advised that the amount of funding required to achieve the objectives for the remainder of the transitional period would be \$20 million.

It is my view that such a step is fully consistent with the uniquely broad mandate which UNTAC has been given by the Security Council to help implement the Paris Agreements. It would also be a relatively modest additional outlay to ensure that the remarkable progress towards peace that has already occurred in Cambodia is not interrupted and that the United Nations endeavours are brought to a successful conclusion.

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I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26096
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of
14 July 1993 (S/26095) concerning Cambodia and agree with the views contained
therein.

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
President of the Security Council



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26097
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With respect to the presidential statement of 15 July 1993 (S/26084), acting upon the instructions of my Government, I would like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the position of Croatia.

It is the firm belief of my Government that the actions aimed at the reopening of the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport for civilian traffic are the legitimate right of Croatia and in the spirit of the Vance plan and the relevant Security Council resolutions. We consider those actions to be a necessary measure owing to the lack of efficiency of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in fulfilling its mandate and in normalizing the living conditions of all the citizens and refugees on the territory of Croatia. In this regard, it must stressed that, in spite of the last series of interim prolongations of its mandate, UNPROFOR has not accomplished the major goals inscribed in the relevant Security Council resolutions, owing to the obstruction by the Serbian side. I have to remind you that the shelling of the Croatian cities was intensive even before the Croatian Government decided to open the bridge.

My Government reiterates its readiness to implement fully all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including resolution 802 (1993), and to promote confidence-building measures, and cooperate in their fulfilment. We would have appreciated the recalling by the Security Council in document S/26084 of the demands stated in the aforesaid resolution in their entirety (e.g. paras. 1, 3 and 4 of resolution 802 (1993)). The Croatian Government believes that full implementation of the resolution is the only way to bring about the rapid conclusion of the agreement on confidence-building measures as called for in Security Council resolution 847 (1993). With this in mind, the armed forces of Croatia will withdraw from the area specified by resolution 802 (1993) at the same time as the Serbian insurgents in the United Nations protected areas and the "pink zones" fulfil their obligations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same resolution.

We believe that "the return of the heavy weapons seized from the UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas" and "disbanding and demobilization of Serb Territorial Defence units or other units of similar functions" is equally as important as

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the withdrawal of the Croatian Army. Therefore, the complete demilitarization of the United Nations protected areas must be considered as the most essential step towards stabilizing the region. It is the intention of the Croatian Government to continue in good faith with the negotiations on confidence-building measures and the normalization of the living conditions in the region.

My Government is committed to assuring UNPROFOR forces freedom of access to the area surrounding the Maslenica Straits and entrusting UNPROFOR - if it is capable - with the security of the civilian traffic over the bridge.

We regret the reference made to the "authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in the letter sent to you by the Secretary-General (S/26082), which was the foundation for the presidential statement, thus legitimizing the authorities in Belgrade as an active participant in this matter. We consider the reopening of the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport an entirely internal matter of Croatia.

I would ask for your kind assistance in having this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26098
17 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, referring to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, has the honour to provide him with the following information:

Security Council resolution 841 (1993) concerning Haiti has been implemented in Finland by a Decree* on the Enforcement of Obligations arising from the United Nations Security Council resolution on Haiti that entered into force on 15 July 1993.

As regards prevention of the sale and supply of petroleum, petroleum products, arms and related matériel to Haiti, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 841 (1993) have been implemented by paragraph 2 of the Decree.

Paragraph 8 of resolution 841 (1993), concerning the freezing of funds, has been implemented by paragraph 3 of the Decree. Paragraph 9, concerning agreements or contracts entered into or licences or permits granted before 23 June 1993, is implemented by paragraph 4 of the Decree.

As regards paragraph 12 of the resolution, it has been implemented by paragraph 6 of the Decree. In accordance with paragraph 4 of Act No. 659/67, concerning the Implementation of Certain Obligations Incumbent upon Finland as a Member of the United Nations, violation of the Decree implementing resolution 841 (1993) is a criminal offence and subject to imprisonment and fines, and seizure, confiscation, etc., of the proceeds of illegal acts.

Officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are available for consultation in cases concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 841 (1993).

* The text of the Decree is available for consultation in the office of the Security Council secretariat, Room S-3545.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/26099
13 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 795 (1992)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish a presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as recommended by him in his report of 9 December 1992 (S/24923). The Council requested in the same resolution that the Secretary-General deploy immediately the military, civil affairs and administrative personnel he had recommended in his report, as well as police monitors, upon receiving the consent of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and to keep the Council regularly informed of the implementation of the resolution. In its resolution 842 (1993) the Council welcomed the offer of a Member State to contribute additional personnel to the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and authorized their deployment. The present report is submitted to inform the Council of UNPROFOR's deployment and activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia prior to this expansion, in keeping with operative paragraph 5 of resolution 795 (1992).

2. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of my report of 9 December set out the recommendations of the exploratory mission, further elaborated in the annex to the report, and approved by the Security Council. These recommendations were:

- (a) "that a small UNPROFOR presence be established on the Macedonian side of the republic's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with an essentially preventive mandate of monitoring and reporting any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory", and
- (b) "that a small group of United Nations civilian police should be deployed in the border areas to monitor the Macedonian border police."

As indicated, in paragraph 4, "the rationale for this latter deployment is that incidents arising from illegal attempts to cross the border have recently led to increased tension on the Macedonian side. The mission believed that the presence of a small United Nations civilian police detachment would have a calming effect."

II. DEPLOYMENT

3. In mid-December 1992, a small team of Civil Affairs officers, a Senior Military Observer and a Senior Administrative Officer was sent to Skopje to discuss with the Government practical arrangements for the deployment of the UNPROFOR Command in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

4. Following the consent given by the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 19 December to the deployment of UNCIVPOL personnel, the first UNCIVPOL monitors arrived on 27 December 1992. Subsequently, UNCIVPOL deployed along the northern and western borders. As at 17 May 1993, there were 24 UNCIVPOL monitors, 10 based in Ohrid, monitoring the western border, and a further 14 located in Skopje, with responsibility for monitoring the northern border.

5. On 28 December, a reconnaissance team from the second Canadian battalion arrived in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to make the necessary arrangements for the interim deployment of a Canadian company, pending the arrival of a joint battalion from Finland, Norway and Sweden. The Canadian company arrived on 7 January 1993 and remained until 18 February 1993.

6. Brigadier-General Finn Saermark-Thomsen of Denmark, who was designated Commander of the Macedonian Command of UNPROFOR, arrived in Skopje on 25 January 1993. On 18 February 1993, the Nordic battalion took over the operation from the Canadian company.

7. The Nordic battalion was deployed on the western border from Debar northward and on the northern border up to the border with Bulgaria. The Nordic battalion is a 434-man force composed of three rifle companies. Its headquarters has been established in Kjojlia, approximately 18 km. east of Skopje. The headquarters in Kjojlia also includes the logistics company. The Finnish company is deployed in the north-western part of the area of operations with its headquarters in Tetovo. The Norwegian company is deployed in the centre of the area of operations with its headquarters in George Petrov in the outskirts of Skopje. The Swedish company is deployed in the north-eastern part of the area of operations with its headquarters in Kumanovo. As at May 1993, there were 18 permanently manned observation posts, 4 along the border with Albania and 14 along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

8. The United States force of some 300 soldiers arrived in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the first two weeks of July, and is in the process of deploying.

9. There are 19 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) in the area of operations. The western border area south of Debar is covered solely by UNMOs, who constitute the main United Nations presence there. They have a small headquarters in Ohrid. At present, 11 UNMOs are responsible for patrolling the area south of Debar. The remaining military observers are deployed on the northern border area or serve at the headquarters in Skopje.

10. The Civil Affairs and the Civilian Administration staff, which consists of four and five professionals, respectively, are located at the headquarters in Skopje.

III. ACTIVITIES

11. Since early January 1993, the northern border and the western border north of Debar have been constantly monitored from observation posts and by regular patrols, first by the Canadian company and then by the Nordic battalion, with a view to reporting any activities that might increase tension or threaten peace and stability. So far their observations, which are made exclusively from inside the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have not shown any activity which might be regarded as posing an external threat to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

12. UNPROFOR military personnel have had a number of encounters with soldiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) who claimed that UNPROFOR had intruded into territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These incidents have so far been resolved satisfactorily. The problem arises from the fact that the border between the two former republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, previously only an internal border, has not been definitively delineated. The two Governments have not yet been able to establish a joint border commission to resolve this matter conclusively. This constitutes a potential source of conflict but both sides have so far refrained from resorting to threats or moves against one another or against UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR continues to lend its good offices in the role of "go-between" as and when required.

13. The UNMOs conduct regular patrols in their area of operations to monitor the situation. They have also carried out a programme of visits to border villages aimed at gaining the confidence of their inhabitants and assisting in defusing possible inter-ethnic tensions.

14. While carrying out their border visiting programme, the UNMOs have been approached by representatives of the ethnic Albanian population who have lodged various complaints about alleged discriminatory practices by the Macedonian authorities. In those cases where the complaints are relevant to UNPROFOR's mandate, they are being brought to the attention of the appropriate national authorities, or, alternatively, to the attention of competent international bodies, such as the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia's Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities (Sub-group on Macedonia) or the Commission on Human Rights.

15. UNCIVPOL conducts regular patrols to specific crossings and the border areas in general on a daily basis to monitor the work of the local border police, in particular with regard to the two shooting incidents on the border with Albania which occurred on 22 February and 19 April, respectively. These incidents reportedly occurred in connection with illegal border crossings. The first resulted in the death of an Albanian national, who was shot by a Macedonian border official. The Albanian national is believed by Macedonian police to have been directly involved in arms smuggling into Macedonia. UNCIVPOL is monitoring these cases closely.

16. UNCIVPOL has received through the Mayor of Debar a number of complaints by Albanians concerning the local border police. In those cases where there appeared prima facie to be a basis for the complaint, UNCIVPOL has taken up the matter with the relevant police authorities.

17. Since the commencement of their activities, UNCIVPOL has enjoyed a good working relationship with the local border police and other border personnel. The cooperation extended by the local authorities has also been most satisfactory.

18. The UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Office has established and maintained regular contacts with the relevant government authorities, members of parliament and representatives of political parties and has ensured coordination with the Mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the humanitarian organizations. With the CSCE mission, appropriate mechanisms of cooperation have been established as called for in Security Council resolution 795 (1992). This has been done in accordance with the Principles of Coordination between UNPROFOR and the CSCE mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which were formally agreed to on 15 April 1993. The level of cooperation which has been achieved is considered by both sides to be highly effective and useful.

19. The Civil Affairs Office established, at the outset, an information programme to explain the role of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its focus has been to ensure that the public is given a variety of opportunities to understand the reason for UNPROFOR's presence and the nature of the deployment. Initially, the reason for the decision to deploy was not fully understood by the general public. An open information policy has been formulated, involving close relations with local radio, television and newspaper editors. At present, a print programme is being finalized to provide, in Macedonian and Albanian, clear explanations of UNPROFOR's presence and the role of the different components in a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

20. UNPROFOR's deployment in the area of operations and its subsequent activities in the performance of its mandate have been greatly facilitated by the supportive attitude and cooperation of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as of authorities at various levels.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE UNPROFOR'S DEPLOYMENT

21. At the time of UNPROFOR's deployment, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was gravely concerned about an external security threat. The UNPROFOR presence and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's admission to membership in the United Nations have contributed to alleviating those fears.

22. Some initial concerns over UNPROFOR's presence on the part of the Albanian sectors of the population have to a large extent been overcome through direct meetings with local officials and representatives of these groups and also through the information programme referred to above. The assistance provided by UNPROFOR to the victims of the tragic air crash which occurred on 5 March in Skopje did much to foster a positive perception of UNPROFOR by the population at large.

V. OBSERVATIONS

23. UNPROFOR has so far been successful in its preventive mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is, of course, too early to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of this deployment in the highly volatile situation that prevails in the region.

24. In this connection, the strengthening of UNPROFOR under Security Council resolution 842 (1993) is a welcome development. As the Council has repeatedly recognized, the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia makes a valuable contribution to stability in the region, and serves as an additional source of support for the international community's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the overall situation in the former Yugoslavia. The tangible support offered to these objectives in the form of the United States deployment will further strengthen confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and underscore the message that the international community will not accept any further widening of the tragic conflict in the region.

25. In proposing the initial deployment of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 9 December 1992 (S/24923), I expressed the belief that a small preventive United Nations deployment would help the countries concerned "to make safe passage through a potentially turbulent and hazardous period". This remains my hope at a time when the conflagration in other parts of the former Yugoslavia shows little sign of abating.

26. I shall continue to keep the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under close review and shall revert to the Council as appropriate in the months to come.



Security Council

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S/26100
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, H.E. Anatoly M. Zlenko, which contains a request to urgently convene a meeting of the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the United Nations Charter and Rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, to consider the situation which has been created as a result of the adoption on 9 July 1993 of a Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Victor H. BATIOUK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English/Russian]

Letter dated 14 July 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the United Nations Charter and Rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council I ask you to urgently convene a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation which has been created as a result of adoption on 9 July 1993 of a Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol.

The Decree of the Russian Parliament alleges so-called "Russian federal status for the city of Sevastopol within the administrative and territorial borders of the city district as of December 1991", it entrusts the Council of Ministers - the Government of the Russian Federation - with a task to "work out a state programme of ensuring the status of the city of Sevastopol by giving appropriate instructions to ministries and agencies of Russia". For the Central Bank of Russia it prescribes "to provide financing of appropriate parts of the budget of the city of Sevastopol through its branches".

The Committee on Constitutional Legislation of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation is entrusted with the "preparation of a Law of the Russian Federation about reflecting in the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the federal status of the city of Sevastopol".

Such an enactment of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation can be described but as a flagrant disregard of universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. It constitutes overt encroachment on the territorial inviolability of Ukraine, an interference into its internal and external affairs and is incompatible with the aims and principles of the United Nations. This enactment is also a flagrant violation of the obligations, which result from Russia's membership in the United Nations, its participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, bilateral agreements between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, in particular the Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 19 November 1990, registered with the United Nations Secretariat in conformity with the Charter of the Organization. In accordance with Article 6 of this Treaty "The High Contracting Parties recognize and honour territorial integrity" of Ukraine and Russia.

Implementation by the Russian authorities of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's decision would have led to adequate actions on the part of Ukraine in order to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The development of the present situation could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Ukraine considers the said decision by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation as having no lawful grounds and no legal consequences for Ukraine.

The question of the status of the city of Sevastopol is in the exclusive competence of Ukraine. Since 1954, after the Crimean region had been transferred from Russia to Ukraine by organs then so authorized, and in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine of 1978, the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978 and the Constitution of the USSR of 1977, the city of Sevastopol is an integral part of Ukraine, as a city of republican subordination, that is, one of the administrative and territorial parts of Ukraine.

Having proclaimed its wish to live in peace, harmony and mutual respect with all states of the world, in particular with its neighbours, Ukraine firmly rejects any territorial claims and appeals to the Security Council of the United Nations to use all its authority to have this illegal decision cancelled by the Parliament of the Russian Federation, warn it against taking further decisions which could jeopardize the international peace and security in the world and give qualification to the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation from the point of view of its conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, purposes of Helsinki Final Act, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other fundamental principles of international law.

(Signed) Anatoly ZLENKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine



Security Council

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S/26101
16 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, a letter by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 July 1993 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

At its 16th session the Defense and National Security Council of the Republic of Croatia discussed the situation in connection with the opening of the Maslenica Bridge and Zadar Airport, and the pressures brought to bear against Croatia because of its intention to open these facilities, and because of responsibility for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this regard the position of the Republic of Croatia is as follows:

1. Croatia is reinstating traffic across the Maslenica Bridge through the Zadar Airport in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Vance Plan, because this is of vital importance, in economic terms, for Southern Croatia, as well as for the delivery of humanitarian aid not only to Dalmatia, but to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. After the destruction of the Maslenica Bridge all the traffic has been handled by ferries and across the Pag Bridge which according to experts' findings, its technical condition is such that it prevents all truck traffic. This is one more reason why traffic must be rerouted without delay across the new pontoon Maslenica Bridge.

Let us point out that the reinstating of traffic is not a military provocation but a peaceful civilian emergency action, and that it is being taken after the failure of all attempts at direct and indirect negotiations with the local Serbs with the assistance of the representatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR. Indeed, this is an opportunity to demonstrate good intentions, and to discontinue the foot-dragging tactics practised in the negotiations by the Serbian side, which are contrary to the spirit and to the letter of the Vance Plan and of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

In view of the foregoing, we urge the international community and the UNPROFOR Command to provide - on the basis of the general recognition of the legitimacy and justifiability of our requests (which has not been challenged either by the latest Report of the President of the United Nations Security Council) - all the required cooperation for the establishment of traffic, this being of vital importance for Croatia, and to bring pressure to bear upon the insurgent Serbs to refrain from all military actions against the Maslenica Bridge which is exclusively a civilian, economic and humanitarian facility.

We reject most vigorously that part of the letter of the United Nations Secretary-General which might warrant the conclusion that agreement is expected not only of the local Serbs but also of another state (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for any activity undertaken by the legitimate Croatian authorities within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia, including the establishment of traffic across the Maslenica Bridge.

2. The Council considers the pressures and threats against Croatia because of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be unfounded for the following reasons:

(a) Croatia was the first to recognize the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and continues to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state.

(b) There have been no agreements whatsoever on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.

(c) In the quest for a solution, Croatia has always shown a high degree of cooperation with the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY. Croatia will support any solution accepted by all the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(d) Croatia endorses the principle of independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We believe that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be brought to an end on the basis of an agreement on the arrangement of that state as a composite, federal tripartite state of the three constituent nations.

(e) There are no regular units of the Croatian Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, except in borderland areas pursuant to Article 8 of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia signed on 21 July 1992. The HVO (Croatian Defence Council) units have been joined by individuals, former members of the Croatian Armed Forces natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had joined, as volunteers, the Croatian Armed Forces during the Serbian aggression against Croatia in order to defend the Republic of Croatia, and have now returned to defend their century-old homes.

(f) The best proof of this position of the Republic of Croatia is to be found in the proposal previously made by Croatia and repeated on this occasion, that UNPROFOR should implement effective control of borders both between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the entire border and not only the border along the UNPAs.

3. Croatia supports all efforts conducive to an effective and immediate end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the agreement of the three constituent peoples in all matters, in the interest of maintaining Bosnia and Herzegovina and of peace in Europe.

Let us remind you that the Republic of Croatia has had to bear the bulk of the burden of the refugee crisis caused by the Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia and, subsequently, against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus far about 650,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority having been Muslims, have crossed the Republic of Croatia en route to other European countries; at present, the Republic of Croatia is providing relief to more than 250,000 displaced persons from the occupied areas of Croatia, and for more than 280,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, about 196,000 of the latter (according to estimates) being Muslims.

As a result of Serbian aggression, more than 200,000 Croats have been expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina; 40,000 Croats have been expelled, an additional 100,000 still being in danger, as a result of Muslim aggression against the HVO in Central Bosnia.

4. Croatia has always and consistently been prepared, and will continue to be prepared, within the scope of the ICFY and of the efforts made by the international community, for negotiations on a peaceful and political solution in the UNPAs, and for the normalization of relations with all states that have emerged in the area of the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

President
of the Republic of Croatia

Dr. Franjo Tudjman



Security Council

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16 July 1993
ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the current month of July, I have the honour to transmit herewith resolution R.5303-OS(99)-M4-19 April 1993 adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 19 April 1993 at its ninety-ninth ordinary session, concerning the combating of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad J. SAMHAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Emirates
to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

Annex I

Baghdad Declaration on the combating of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation

The Council of the League,

Having taken cognizance of:

- The memorandum of the General Secretariat,
- The draft Baghdad Declaration on the combating of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation,
- The recommendation of the Standing Legal Committee at its meeting from 27 to 30 October 1992,
- Resolution 5249 of the Council of the League, adopted on 13 September 1992 at its ninety-eighth session,
- Resolution 115 of the Council of Arab Ministers of Transport, adopted on 20-21 October 1992 at its eighth session,
- The recommendation of the Legal Affairs Committee,

Decides:

To approve the Baghdad Declaration on the combating of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation in the form annexed hereto.

(R.5303-OS(99)-M4-19 April 1993)

Annex II

Baghdad Declaration on the combating of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation

The Council of Arab Ministers of Transport at its fifth session, held at Baghdad from 21 to 22 October 1989, being aware of the security hazards arising from unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation and endangering passengers, taking into account the negative impact of such acts on air transport activity and commercial exchanges at the Arab and the international levels,

Realizing the urgent need for the Arab States to cooperate and to coordinate their positions on the combating of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation,

Declares its commitment to the principles of combating unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, as follows:

I. The following shall be deemed to be unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation:

- (a) Seizing or taking control of a civil aircraft by the use or threat of force or by the use of any kind of coercion, whatever the motive may be;
- (b) Acts of sabotage or armed attack against aircraft, ground installations or airplanes used for civil aviation purposes;
- (c) Any kind of participation in the above acts.

II. Means of combating unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation:

The Arab States undertake to adopt the measures contained in the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970 and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation of 1971, most particularly in the following cases:

- Where the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in a State signatory to the two above-mentioned conventions;
- Where the aircraft on which the offence was committed lands in the territory of such State and the suspect is on board or in the territory of that State;
- Where the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business or permanent domicile is in such State.

Jurisdiction over the suspect:

The Arab State in whose territory the suspect is arrested shall extradite the suspect in accordance with the provisions of the relevant international

conventions, unless the suspect whose extradition is sought is a national of the State in which he was arrested, in which case he shall be tried in that State.

The Arab State in whose territory the offence was committed or the suspect arrested shall notify the International Civil Aviation Organization, in accordance with its national legislation, of all information pertaining to the incident.

III. Arab States that have not yet acceded to the international conventions for the combating of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, in particular the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, the Montreal Convention of 1971 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal in 1988, are called upon to do so.

IV. The Arab States shall cooperate in combating unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation by adopting the following measures:

(a) Taking all measures to prevent the occurrence of unlawful acts in their territory, as provided for in this Declaration and in international conventions and the instruments and resolutions adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization;

(b) Returning aircraft and freight to their lawful owner, while facilitating the prompt onward passage of passengers and crew;

(c) Exchanging information and data and coordinating appropriate measures for the suppression of the unlawful acts specified in the Declaration;

(d) The acts covered by the Declaration shall be deemed extraditable in any extradition treaty concluded between Arab member States.



Security Council

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LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the latest developments with regard to Iraq's failure to comply with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the other relevant resolutions since the Council's last review of the sanctions regime against Iraq on 21 May 1993. This conduct constitutes a flagrant breach of the commitment it entered into on accepting that resolution and persistent defiance of the will of the international community. Iraq's approach to the discharge of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions has remained basically unchanged in spite of its superficial claim to be implementing them in order to have the sanctions lifted without fully shouldering its basic responsibilities in respect of the substance and the spirit and letter of those resolutions. The following account of some Iraqi practices provides evidence of its failure to comply with the resolutions of the international community.

I. United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission

In spite of the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to the effect that Iraq and Kuwait should respect the inviolability of the international boundary between them and in spite of the fact that the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission completed all of its work and the tasks assigned to it under resolution 687 (1991) on 20 May 1993, Iraq continues to insist on its position, which challenges the Commission's reports and decisions. This position constitutes a clear proof of its reneging on resolution 687 (1991), as may be inferred from a review of the following practices:

(a) A letter dated 7 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Iraqi regime attacks the Boundary Demarcation Commission and its credibility and questions the impartiality of its members and the legitimacy and justice of its decisions. It also challenges the authority of the Security Council and some of its members and attacks the United Nations by impugning its senior officials. Furthermore, the letter reveals Iraq's position disputing the existence of Kuwait as an independent sovereign entity. The Security Council responded to such excess in the form of a statement by its President dated 28 June 1993, as it had responded previously when Iraq disputed Kuwait's existence in the form of the President's statement of 17 June 1992, which states

in one of its paragraphs, and I quote: "The members of the Council firmly reject any suggestion that tends to dispute the very existence of Kuwait, a Member State of the United Nations."

(b) Its persistent disregard of the binding and definitive nature of the Commission's decisions concerning the demarcation of the land and offshore boundaries.

(c) Its position on Security Council resolution 833 (1993) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, in which the Council welcomed the Committee's decisions regarding the demarcation of the land and offshore boundaries and demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary between the two countries and the right to navigational access.

(d) The infiltration by some elements across the boundary line to carry out sabotage operations and attack Kuwaiti property in the border area.

(e) Its refusal to cooperate with the United Nations in its current efforts to delimit farms and carry out a census of Iraqi farmers who are at present in Kuwaiti territory adjacent to the Iraqi border with a view to compensating and evacuating them.

II. Iraqi assertions that Kuwait belongs to it

As we are aware of the danger of Iraqi claims and of the fact that they must not be ignored or passed over in silence, we sent two letters to the President of the Security Council, which were issued as documents S/25384 and S/25465 dated 8 and 23 March 1993 respectively, in which we described the adverse repercussions of these claims on peace and security in the region because of the persistence of Iraqi designs on Kuwait. Given Iraq's indifference to the resolutions of the Security Council and its failure to comply with the demands of its members, it must be summoned to desist from these claims each time the sanctions regime is reviewed, since they constitute unequivocal defiance of the substance of those resolutions, which require Iraq to respect the independence and sovereignty of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and its international legitimacy.

We wish to review some of these Iraqi claims that have come to light since the last review, for your benefit and for the benefit of the members of the Security Council:

1. On 24 May 1993 the Iraqi Minister of Information, Nuri Najm al-Marsumi, referred in an article published in the Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawrah to Kuwait's being "remote from its Iraqi national environment" and in a later paragraph to "raising the consciousness of the Iraqis of Kuwait". In a subsequent paragraph he says "Iraq's acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council and its full commitment to their implementation should not be interpreted as meaning that Iraq accepts encroachments on its boundaries". After lengthy assertions and threats in this vein, he states: "We issue a warning that, when Iraq's patience is exhausted, tunnels and walls will be of no avail and the thieves of Kuwait will find no means of moving to Riyadh this time round." All of this demonstrates the hostile bent of Iraqi policy, with its persistent talk of a further invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

2. On 2 June 1993, the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Usama Abd ar-Razzaq al-Hithi, said in an interview with the Iraqi newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah: "We have a historic right to Kuwait, and it was snatched from us unjustly and aggressively."

III. The question of Kuwaiti prisoners and missing persons and nationals of the following countries:

With regard to this purely humanitarian question, although two years have passed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in spite of Iraq's official acceptance of that resolution, no progress whatsoever has been made in the matter for the following reasons:

1. Iraq has not yet discharged its obligations under paragraph 30 of that resolution, which requires it to extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), by providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the Committee to the places where they are located or detained and facilitating the Committee's search for them.

2. Although four months have passed, Iraq has not yet replied to the official request to it from ICRC for information concerning the files of 627 individuals, thus reneging on its previous undertaking to reply regarding any file within 10 days of receiving it.

3. Outside the context of the Security Council's mechanism for dealing with this matter, Iraq has prevented the Secretary-General's Envoy to the League of Arab States, Mr. Rashid Idris, from carrying out his mission to visit Iraq and use his good offices as a mediator for the release of the prisoners and detainees. It has also thwarted the efforts of the Moroccan monarch, King Hassan II, and his gracious mediation with a view to securing the release of Kuwaiti prisoners and detainees.

IV. Return of property stolen from the public and private sectors

Despite Iraq's superficial cooperation in this matter, it should be borne in mind that, what Iraq returns in fulfilment of its obligation under resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) represents an incomplete implementation of those resolutions for the following reasons:

1. Most of the equipment handed over by Iraq has been intentionally wrecked or destroyed, even just a few hours before the hand-over, which renders them worthless and of no further use.

2. The Iraqi authorities still insist that they are not responsible for the return of property worth hundreds of millions of dollars stolen from the private sector, some of which was burned and some of which was moved to Iraq according to inventories published by Iraqi ministries, signed and sealed by special government bodies that came to Kuwait to supervise the stealing and transport operations. We have in our possession a number of originals and photocopies of such records which were left behind by the Iraqi regime when it was expelled.

3. Iraq is not fulfilling its obligations with regard to the lists agreed on with the United Nations Coordinator for the hand-over of stolen property inasmuch as it is constantly out to postpone and delay the hand-over operations, which entails additional financial costs and administrative measures for Kuwait.

V. The Compensation Fund

Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation with regard to compensation under section E of resolution 687 (1991), operation of the Compensation Fund in the manner specified in paragraph 19 of the resolution and disclosure of its gold and hard currency assets, since it persists in refusing to implement resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), a violation that entails double misfortune for Iraqis and non-Iraqis alike. This question is also a humanitarian issue of great importance which Iraq should be made to answer for in full.

VI. Weapons of mass destruction

Iraq's cooperation with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency has not been up to standard inasmuch as Iraq, in spite of its claims to be providing information on the programme for the development of chemical and biological weapons and cooperating with the inspection teams, systematically restricts the freedom of movement of the United Nations Special Commission and has on several occasions, as you know, threatened individuals serving on the Commission. Moreover, in an act of barefaced defiance it currently refuses to permit the installation of cameras in weapons development sites prohibited under resolution 687 (1991). In addition, Iraq still refuses to accept United Nations resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) concerning long-term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction in its possession and to reveal the names of the companies that supplied it with the materials and equipment to produce such weapons.

VI. Terrorism

As usual, the Iraqi regime is not complying with the provisions of section H, paragraph 32, of resolution 687 (1991), which "requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards the commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism". But what was the attempt by Iraqi Intelligence to assassinate and to blow up the former United States President George Bush and his entourage during his visit to Kuwait but an act of international terrorism and a flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991)? Those accused of this act are currently being tried before an open court in Kuwait in full view of the Arab and foreign media and in the presence of representatives of humanitarian organizations. The accused are being represented by lawyers, some of whom they chose themselves and some of whom were appointed by the court in deference to the absolute right to defence under the law.

The questions raised above are reliable indicators of Iraq's persistent pursuit of a policy of defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council. As the main aim of these resolutions is to secure full respect for Kuwait's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the international community

must take appropriate measures to secure Iraq's compliance in letter and spirit with all relevant Security Council resolutions. It should not merely focus on dealing with questions and issues arising from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait because unless the reasons for the invasion are addressed, that is to say the continued assertion that Kuwait is a part of Iraq, the matter will not be settled and Iraq's intentions will continue to pose a threat to security and peace in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26104
19 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF LATVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to bring to his attention a statement dated 13 July 1993 by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Latvia on a decision adopted by the Russian Federation Supreme Council Presidium which foresees the presentation to the Russian Federation Supreme Council the issue which comprises the denunciation of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, signed at Riga on 11 August 1920 (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations should be grateful if the Secretary-General of the United Nations would have the text of this note and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

Statement dated 13 July 1993 by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia

The Russian Federation Supreme Council Presidium has adopted a decision which foresees the presentation to the Russian Federation Supreme Council the issue which comprises the denunciation of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, signed at Riga on 11 August 1920.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Latvia understands such a decision as an unfriendly act in relation to Latvia which could only bring forth further confrontation, especially in view of the fact that the matter concerns the treaty of peace which ended the state of war between these two States. The decision of the Supreme Council Presidium is an open attempt to revise the border between Latvia and Russia, which was defined in the 1920 Treaty of Peace.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs points out that if the Russian Federation Supreme Council should adopt such a decision, then a dangerous precedent would be created, which from an international law as well as from a practical viewpoint could bring forth unpredictable consequences. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers that the proposed denunciation of the currently valid treaty of peace could only threaten the development of favourable State relations between Latvia and the Russian Federation.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses the hope that the Russian Federation Supreme Council will be able to refrain from a purely emotional resolution of this issue.



Security Council

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S/26105
19 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 6 to 12 July 1993, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi national airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation and to drop heat flares.

6 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 89 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-12,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Jalibah, Salman, southern Najaf and Busayyah.

7 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-7,500 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 93 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah and Artawi.

- At 1110 hours on 7 July 1993, aggressor aircraft dropped five heat flares on Kalak township in Ninawa governorate.

8 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 38 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Zakho and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 56 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-9,500 m, centred on Qurnah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shatrah, Salman, Lasaf and Busayyah.

- At 1250 hours on 8 July 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Artawi, Basra, Shatrah, southern Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah. It departed at 1535 hours, overflying Busayyah and heading in the direction of Saudi Arabian airspace.

9 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 65 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-10,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Artawi, Amarah, Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Salman, Jalibah and Busayyah.

10 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 3,000-8,000 m, centred on Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 71 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-10,000 m, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah Samawah, Amarah, Shatrah, Busayyah, Lasaf, Salman and Qal'at Salih.

11 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 4,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Salman, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

- At 2226 hours on 11 July 1993, a United States F-4 aircraft dropped heat flares to the north of the northern Rumaylah oilfield.

12 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 37 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 94 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-10,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qurnah, Salman, Lasaf, Ushbayjah, Amarah and Mu'ayanah.

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I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
